Border Effects in House Prices by Micheli, Martin et al.
VU Research Portal
Border Effects in House Prices




DOI (link to publisher)
10.1111/1540-6229.12255
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Article 25fa Dutch Copyright Act
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Micheli, M., Rouwendal, J., & Dekkers, J. (2019). Border Effects in House Prices. Real Estate Economics, 47(3),
757–783 . https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6229.12255
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021




Border Effects in House Prices
Martin Micheli,* Jan Rouwendal**,*** and Jasper Dekkers***
This article estimates the effect of the Dutch–German border on house prices.
We argue that the difference between house prices at the border indicates the
willingness to pay to stay in a country compared to living across the border.
After a change in the tax rules in 2001, migration from the Netherlands to Ger-
many increased substantially and the gradient of Dutch house price towards
the German border steepened. Combining a German and Dutch real estate
dataset and using different estimation strategies, we find that asking prices of
comparable housing drop by about 16% when one crosses the Dutch–German
border.
Introduction
House prices vary continuously over space due to arbitrage mechanisms like in
the monocentric city model. However, prices may jump at boundaries, where
these arbitrage mechanisms break down. One example for such boundaries
are landscape features such as rivers or mountains, which hinder arbitrage
via their effects on commuting costs. Other factors that are associated with
language and culture, which have been shown to affect trade and migration
flows (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2006, Melitz 2008, Falck et al. 2012,
Isphording and Otten 2013), might also result in a jump in house prices. It
is well known that school quality affects housing prices (Black 1999, Fack
and Grenet 2010), resulting in house price discontinuities at school district
boundaries. Piazzesi, Schneider and Stroebel (2015) show that differences in
search activity foster a segmentation of the housing market. Another source of
price differences in the housing market are institutional features, which have
been shown to result in discontinuities in land prices (Capozza and Helsley
1989).
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However, as far as we know, there is no research that investigates the pos-
sible presence of discontinuities in house prices across country boundaries.
National borders typically are substantial barriers for arbitrage. The presence
of a price discontinuity in tradable goods due to a national boundary has
been well documented in the literature. Engel and Rogers (1996) find that the
boundary between Canada and the United States, which may be qualified as
“relatively innocuous” (McCallum 1995, p. 622), is equivalent to a distance of
1,780 miles between two cities in terms of price dispersion of similar goods
(Engel and Rogers 1996, p. 1120).
A discontinuity in the house price function at a national border indicates
reluctance to cross the border from the expensive to the cheap country to take
advantage of lower house prices. The upper bound of this price difference
between the two countries is determined by the willingness to accept the
combination of higher house prices and staying in one’s own country. This
article contributes to the literature by analyzing this upper bound for two
economically and culturally similar countries that allow free movement of
workers: Germany and the Netherlands.
This article unfolds as follows: The following section discusses institutional
and socioeconomic differences that might explain differences in house prices
in the two countries. In Section “Interpretation of border effects in house
prices,” we develop a simple conceptual framework that suggests under which
conditions a discontinuity in house prices at a border is informative about
the willingness to pay for the difference in amenities on both sides of the
border. We document the development of house prices in the Dutch border
region in the past 25 years and show that house prices within the Netherlands
were decreasing towards the German border. We also show that migration
to Germany increased in the early 2000s, which coincidences with a change
in Dutch tax rules. The substantial increase in migration flows since this
time indicates that the house price difference might have reached this up-
per bound, such that price differences are informative about the willingness
to pay to stay in a Dutch environment. Section “Data on house prices on
both sides of the border 2007–2011” presents the combined geocoded Dutch
and German asking price dataset covering the years from 2007 to 2011,
which we use to analyze the border effect. Using information on the location
of the different houses allows us to estimate the difference in the quality
adjusted house price that occurs directly at the border. Section “Analysis”
reports the results of several analyses of the price difference in the border
region. We find an average border effect of about 16%, or approximately
€38,000 at the mean. Section “Discussion of Results” discusses potential
causes for a price difference. We show that differences in local charges
partly explain this estimated price difference. However, about 10 percentage
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Figure 1  Real house prices in Germany and the Netherlands 1975–2013
(1975 = 100).
Source: Mack and Martı́nez-Garcı́a (2011), International House Price Database, Dallas Fed.
points of the house price difference remain unexplained. Section “Conclusion”
concludes.
Institutional and Socioeconomic Differences
The Dutch economy is closely connected to the–much larger–German econ-
omy. Long before the Euro was established, the currencies of the two countries
were already closely tied to each other by coordination of monetary and, more
generally, macroeconomic policies. Nevertheless, the development of house
prices in the two countries studied has been very different. Since 1975, the
Netherlands faced two housing cycles while prices in Germany have been
rather stable (Figure 1). Because the lines refer to indexes, they do not re-
veal price differences, but the substantial differences in price developments
strongly suggest that at least during particular periods, there must have been
huge differences in price levels as well, as was indeed the case.
The first things that come to mind when looking for explanations for dif-
ferences between housing markets in the Netherlands and in Germany are
population growth and mortgage interest deductibility. In many European
countries, the post-World War II baby boom was soon followed by a substan-
tial decrease in birth rates. This decrease has been especially pronounced in
Germany, which has one of the lowest birth rates in the EU, whereas birth
rates in the Netherlands remained relatively high until the late 1960s.
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There also appears to be an important difference between the two countries
with respect to housing supply. Vermeulen and Rouwendal (2007) find that the
price elasticity of housing supply in the Netherlands is virtually equal to zero,
whereas Lerbs (2014) finds significant (both statistically and economically)
effects of house prices on construction activity in Germany. In other words:
housing supply is more elastic in Germany, which has a stabilizing effect on
house prices. In contrast, the combination of growing demand and inelastic
supply was probably an important driver of increasing house prices in the
Netherlands.
In addition to the difference in supply elasticities, there is an important dif-
ference in the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in the two countries,
which may play an important role. Ever since the introduction of an income
tax in the Netherlands in the early 20th century, interest paid on mortgage
loans was deductible from taxable income.1 This is in stark contrast to Ger-
many where mortgage interest payments for owner-occupied housing are not
tax deductible.2 In Germany, deductibility of interest paid is restricted to
nonowner occupied real estate. Mortgage interest deductibility in itself does
not necessarily lead to higher house prices unless there is some supply inelas-
ticity. However, in combination with extremely price inelastic housing supply
in the Netherlands this tax facility has probably contributed to a higher price
level in the Netherlands.
To complete the picture, some other factors have to be considered. Both
countries differ substantially in the way home ownership is stimulated. In
the Netherlands, the national mortgage guarantee (abbreviated in Dutch as
NHG) implies that the Dutch state guarantees repayment of accepted mortgage
loans to the lender.3 For this insurance, households pay a one-time premium,
but this premium is very low and because mortgage suppliers offer lower
interest rates for insured loans, it typically is paid-back within a few years.4
1Since about the year 2000, Dutch workers living in Germany can opt for the Dutch
income tax system, which implies that they continue to be able to benefit from
mortgage interest deductibility. Until recently, this was possible with any type of
mortgage, but at present mortgage interest deductibility for new contracts has been
restricted to fixed price and linear mortgages.
2Imputed rents also do not have to be added to taxable income in Germany, but we
noted already that in the Netherlands they are determined at a very low level. The
tax rules in the Netherlands ensure that the net effect of subtracting mortgage interest
paid and adding imputed rent can never result in a higher taxable income.
3For a detailed discussion of the National Mortgage Guarantee and the factors that
determine whether households take advantage of this guarantee, see Cox and Zwinkels
(2016).
4This means that the premium is so low that the lower interest rate banks are willing
to offer in return for the disappearance of the default risk is more than sufficient to
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If a household qualifies for the guarantee, loan to value (LTV) ratios larger
than 1 become possible–and are indeed common–as not only the full sales
price of the house but also the transaction costs involved can be financed by
the insured mortgage loan. The essential eligibility requirement is that the
ratio between the mortgage payments and household income should not be
too high–typically the threshold is around 30%–and that the workers in the
household have a permanent contract.5
To see how this could contribute to the development of Dutch house prices
shown in Figure 1, consider for simplicity a household that takes an interest-
only mortgage loan. The maximum size L of the loan is given by the equation:
i L = cY , where i is the (net) interest rate, Y is household income from
tenured jobs and c is the critical share of mortgage payment in household
income. Clearly, the maximum bid a household can make for a house is
equal to cY/ i , a decreasing function of the interest rate i . In the 1970s,
interest rates were relatively low and households could pay five or six times
their annual income for their houses while still qualifying for the mortgage
insurance. Around 1980, there was a shift towards a much tighter monetary
policy and initially interest rates increased considerably, implying much lower
borrowing (and bidding) capacity of Dutch households. In the course of the
1980s and 1990s, interest rates gradually declined, while the increasing share
of double earner households6 and economic growth led to significant increases
in household income. These developments contributed to the substantially
higher borrowing capacity of Dutch households. Because housing supply was
essentially inelastic, the increased bidding capacity did not lead to better
or more luxury houses, but predominantly to higher prices for the same
houses (Vermeulen and Rouwendal 2007). Note that in this analysis the
possibility to realize high LTV ratios–which exists in the Netherlands, but
not in Germany–is essential, because the necessity to invest–say–20% of
the value of the house from other sources (such as savings) would have
made it much more difficult for first-time Dutch buyers to pay the high
prices.
pay it. This may raise doubts about the appropriateness of the level of the premium.
However, even in the current crisis, the number of defaults has remained low and the
NHG funds accumulated from past premiums paid have been sufficiently large.
5There is also an upper limit on the price of the house.
6In the Netherlands, the increase in female labor force participation occurred relatively
late. Many women working have a part-time job. Only in the course of the 1990s,
banks started taking into account the income of the second worker when determining
a household’s borrowing capacity.
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In Germany, the government encourages saving for house purchases through
fiscal measures.7 A contractual savings system allows households to pin down
interest rates on contracts for future borrowing for house purchases. Due to
government subsidies, these contracts offer favorable conditions compared
to other types of borrowing. On the other hand, such subsidized contracts
are conditional on the commitment to save before obtaining the loan, which
reduces the required size of the loan and decreases the LTV ratio due to
higher equity, which arguably has a stabilizing effect on house prices.
In addition, the difference in accessibility of the rental market between the
two countries may have further contributed to the different development of
house prices. In Germany, the rental sector is large–56% of households do
not own their main residence–and open to all households. In the Netherlands,
the rental sector is somewhat smaller–43% of all households rent their main
residence–and consists predominantly of social rental housing, which is rent-
controlled. In the Netherlands, there is severe excess demand for social rental
housing, especially in larger cities, and because the rationing systems favor
lower incomes, households with higher incomes are practically unable to rent.
Unlike in Germany, renting is therefore not a genuine alternative to owning
for many Dutch households. Note that this contributes to making demand less
price elastic than it would be if the rental market offered a good substitute to
owner-occupied housing.
Interpretation of Border Effects in House Prices
The discussion in the previous section suggests that the housing markets in
the Netherlands and in Germany differ substantially, which results in different
developments of the house prices. If arbitrage would be impossible, this
would imply that house prices on both sides of the Dutch-German border
were independent of each other and substantial differences were possible.
However, as Germany and the Netherlands are both members of the European
Union and both have ratified the Schengen Treaty, the border dividing the two
countries is in fact easy to cross. Arbitrage should thus be possible, at least
in principle and it should be expected to impose a limit on the possible price
difference. The size of this limit is determined by the value of the difference
in amenities on both sides of the border. This includes possible differences in
property taxation and other local charges that are directly related to housing,
but also to “softer” aspects like the preference to live among people speaking
the same language and the appreciation of differences in the landscape that
are associated with the two land use planning systems. The total value of
7Up until 2006, the government subsidized the first real estate purchase for all tax-
payers. However, this subsidy has been abolished in 2006.
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all these differences determine the size of the limit, which may of course be
different for Germans and Dutch citizens. In the time interval that we study–
the early 21st century–house prices were clearly higher in the Netherlands
and we should therefore expect an existing gap in the house prices at the
border only to reveal the willingness to pay of Dutch households to stay in
their own country.
The case for such an interpretation of a price difference that emerges at
the border is especially convincing if arbitrage does indeed takes place, that
is, if Dutch households regularly relocate across the border. It is therefore
interesting to note that migration from the Netherlands to Germany responded
substantially to a change in tax rules. Since 2001, Dutch citizens can opt for
the Dutch income tax even if they live across the border in Germany as long
as they have a job in the Netherlands.8 This means that Dutch migrants can
take the mortgage interest deductibility with them as long as their job remains
in the Netherlands. This change in tax treatment should be expected to have
facilitated arbitrage by moving across the border by significantly lowering the
relevant limit for the price difference of housing prices.9
There is strong evidence that such arbitrage has been present since ap-
proximately 2000. First, net migration from the Netherlands to Germany
increased substantially, starting in the early 2000s, when Dutch house prices
increased rapidly and it became possible for Dutch workers to take advantage
of mortgage interest deductibility even when moving across the border (see
Figure A1 in the Appendix). After a temporary drop around 2008, which is
probably due to the recession, net migration to Germany increased again until
2010.
Second, the number of Dutch citizens living in the German part of the border
region started to increase in 2001 (Figure A2). This development is in line with
numerous newspaper reports in the early 2000s concerning Dutch citizens who
had moved just across the German border to live in a much larger house for the
same or even a lower price. The arbitrage interpretation of these migration
flows between the two countries is supported by the locations individuals
8This is also the case for Dutch households living in Belgium and other countries.
The general principle follows from jurisprudence at the European level in the 1990s
according to which workers living abroad must (have the possibility to) be taxed in
the same way as those living in the country in which their job is located. The so-called
“keuzeregeling” (choice possibility) is included in article 2.5 of the Dutch income tax
law of 2001.
9In the example of the interest-only mortgage discussed in the previous section, a
household can bid 2.5 times as much for a house when there is mortgage interest
deductibility.
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choose as residence. Dutch people who live in Germany are much more
concentrated in the areas that are contiguous to the Netherlands (Figure 2).10
For Germans living in the Netherlands, this pattern of a high concentration
in the foreign border region does not exist.
A final piece of evidence that supports the presence of arbitrage since around
2000 is provided by a hedonic analysis of the development of house prices
in the 50 km band along the Dutch border. We estimated a hedonic price
function with municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects and distance to the
German border with a year-specific coefficient as explanatory variables.11
Figure 3 shows the development of the implied price index for housing
exactly at the border and 50 km inside the Netherlands. House prices at the
border have increased considerably over time with a peak in 2008, when the
financial-economic crisis started to affect the Dutch housing market.12 Prices
of properties 50 km within the Netherlands have always been higher than
at the border. However, around 2000 the discrepancy between the two series
is growing, probably reflecting the stronger impact of the proximity to the
German border that is due to the improved possibilities for arbitrage. The
development of the price gradient is shown in Figure A3 in the Appendix.
Data on House Prices on Both Sides of the Border 2007–2011
To evaluate the difference in house prices that can be attributed to the bound-
ary we now compare house prices on both sides of the border. As information
on German house prices is available starting in 2007 we restrict the analysis
to the years 2007—2011.13 In Germany, we observe houses that were offered
on the website of ImmobilienScout24. This website allows realtors as well as
private sellers to offer their real estate for sale or rent. It is the largest and
most frequented internet real estate market place in Germany. Immobilien-
Scout24 estimates that about 50% of all real estate objects offered for sale
or rent in Germany are offered via their website (Georgi and Barkow 2010).
Because transaction values are not observed, we use the last price for which
the house was offered on this website.
10Vulkaneifel, which also attracts a large number of Dutch people, is a popular holiday
destination.
11Details are available on request.
12Another illustration of this finding is the development of the price gradient over time
in Figure A3.
13For a description of the dataset see an de Meulen, Micheli and Schaffner (2014).
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Figure 2  Share of foreigners on both sides of the German–Dutch border.
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: Data from CBS Statline (2013) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2014). Map: authors’
illustration.
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Figure 3  Development of the Dutch housing price near the German border
(1985–2013). [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
For the Netherlands, we observe houses that were offered on the FUNDA
website by realtors that are members of the NVM. FUNDA is the largest
website for houses in the Netherlands. It only registers houses offered for
sale via members of NVM, which means that approximately 70% of the
national supply is offered on this website. However, this share differs across
regions.14 To make the data comparable with those available for Germany we
do not use information on transaction values, but only the last observed price
on the FUNDA website. Moreover, for the same reason we add information
about Dutch houses that have been withdrawn from the FUNDA website
without being sold.
Using asking prices instead of observed transaction prices–unfortunately–
adds an additional source of uncertainty. There is one study that investigates
the difference between the last observed asking price of objects advertised
at ImmobilienScout24 and the actual transaction price in Germany: For rural
regions in Rhineland-Palatine, Dinkel and Kurzrock (2012) find a difference
of about 15%. Kholodilin, Mense and Michelsen (2017) argue that for a
sample in Berlin, the difference between online ads (including data from Im-
mobilienScout24) and transaction prices is rather small. Other studies (Faller
et al. 2009, Henger and Voigtländer 2014) comparing asking prices from dif-
ferent sources with transaction prices find a slightly smaller price discrepancy
14Our sample of properties offered for sale–via ImmobilienScout24 for Germany and
via FUNDA for the–Netherlands does not necessarily constitute a random sample
the housing stock. However, the same is true for property transactions. To overcome
this selection bias, in what follows we control for object quality employing hedonic
methods.
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than Dinkel and Kurzrock (2012). Therefore, given availability constraints for
transaction prices in Germany, asking prices seem to be a useful substitute
for transaction prices (Faller et al. 2009).
Using this combined dataset, we employ a method proposed by Black (1999)
to measure the impact of the border on house prices. We restrict our analysis
to a narrowly defined border region. We only include objects in our analysis
that are located within a distance of 10 km of the German–Dutch border. This
guarantees that objects far away from the border do not distort the analysis.
The number of observations on the Dutch side of the border is substantially
higher: the ratio of Dutch houses to German ones in the datasets is about 7:1.
This large difference might be due to several causes. First, market coverage
of ImmobilienScout24 in Germany is about 50%, which is lower than that of
NVM in the Netherlands (70%).15 Second, it might be due to differences in the
average time until a given object is offered for sale again. In Germany, house
owners are incentivized to hold on to their properties, as they have to pay
taxes on speculative gains, if a house is sold within 10 years of the purchase.
At the time, the Dutch housing market appeared somewhat overheated and
the annual number of transactions dropped substantially when Dutch house
prices decreased further after 2011. Third, because of the large rental market
in Germany, potential buyers that are not sure about their future household
size or whether they will stay in the same city might be tempted to rent,
as renting is associated with lower costs of relocation. In the Netherlands,
this mechanism does not work because entrance to the social rental sector is
limited, and a private rental market is virtually absent. Finally, there could be
differences in population density on both sides of the border. To investigate
the latter issue we present population density in Figure A4 in the Appendix. It
appears that for most parts of the border population densities are comparable
on the German and the Dutch side.
Apart from the last observed list price, the two datasets provide information
about the exact location (x-y coordinates) and several other housing charac-
teristics. Included in both datasets are living space, lot size (both in square
meters), number of rooms, year of construction, house type, the last time an
object has been advertised and the location. We report descriptive statistics
for these variables in Table 1, subdivided for objects that are located within
a 5 km distance to the German–Dutch border as well as objects further away
(5–10 km) for both countries.
The descriptive statistics show the presence of statistically significant price
differences between houses on both sides of the border. On average, house
15Note that the differences between the numbers of observations on both sides of the
border are much larger than expected based on market coverage.
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prices of objects within a boundary of 5 km to the Dutch–German border are
about 23,000 Euros more expensive in the Netherlands than in Germany. The
difference is larger if we also consider houses at a distance between 5 and
10 km, as Dutch house prices are higher in that area. Additionally to that,
houses in the Netherlands are slightly smaller (in terms of living space and
lot size) and less recently build, implying that the price mark-up for identical
houses might be even more pronounced. The differences in the amount of
living space and lot size are consistent with the urbanization patterns on both
sides of the border documented in Tennekes and Harbers (2012).
Analysis
Up until now we have documented that first, house prices on the Dutch
side of the Dutch-German border have been increasing less than within the
country and that second, average house prices in a narrowly defined border
region of within 10 km reach of the border are lower in Germany than in the
Netherlands. This is suggestive of a price effect that can be attributed to the
border, but it does not necessarily imply the presence of a discontinuity at
the border. To investigate whether the house price function is discontinuous
at the Dutch–German border, as we suggest in Section 2, we proceed with
regression analysis. To check for the robustness of our results, we test for
a discontinuity in the house price function in three different ways. First, in
Section 5.1, we estimate a hedonic price function that takes the distance to
the boundary into account. Second, in Section 5.2, we compare the house
price difference of objects that are spatially close to each other such that
these objects might be thought of as actual substitutes. Finally, in Section 5.3,
we analyze regional variation in the price effect of the border.
Hedonic Price Analysis
Hedonic theory implies that the bundle of its defining characteristics deter-
mines the quality of a good. By estimating a hedonic price function, we are
able to extract the implicit value of each characteristic of a house.
Pi = βZ Zi + βdNed Distancei ∗ dNedi + βdGer Distancei ∗ dGeri
+β f dGeri + βb Bi + εi . (1)
In Equation (1), P represents the logarithmic transformation of house i’s
asking price. We control for an object’s individual characteristics via Z ,
individual characteristics are described in Section 4. As we observe an object’s
individual location, we can calculate the distance to the boundary given by the
beeline, represented by Distance. The variables d Ned and dGer are in order
dummy variables indicating whether the house is located in the Netherlands
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or in Germany. To allow for differences in the price level with respect to the
location, we include fixed effects for the closest border segment B. The price
effect of the respective border segment βb is independent of whether the house
is located in the Netherlands or in Germany.16 This captures potential regional
differences in house prices that are independent of the border, as house
prices in employment centers such as Maastricht and Aachen might be higher
than prices in the less densely populated regions in the North. In Table 2,
we report the estimation results for the specification with polynomials up to
the power four for distance to the boundary.
All estimation results are in line with the intuition. The estimated coefficient
for the dummy variable β f , which indicates whether or not the object is lo-
cated in Germany, is highly significant. Houses in Germany are roughly 15%
cheaper than their counterparts of identical quality on the Dutch side.17 Addi-
tionally to this direct effect, the border seems to affect house prices in another
way. In the Netherlands, house prices decrease with decreasing distance to
the German border. To illustrate this we report the impact the distance to
the Dutch–German border on house prices in Figure 4. The different lines
represent the impact based on the different estimations. First, assuming a lin-
ear relationship only, then stepwise including an additional polynomial. This
convergence on the Dutch part seems robust to the inclusion of additional
polynomials. However, it cannot be found on the German side, as one might
have expected prices to increase with decreasing distance to the Netherlands.
These results are suggestive of the importance of the distance to the boundary
for the respective object’s price. However, the price of specific characteristics
might also be a function of an object’s distance to the boundary. To take
this into account, we include the interaction of living space and lot size with
distance to the boundary. Regression results are reported in Table A1. All
interaction terms are highly significant, e.g., the price for a one percent larger
lot size for houses in Germany significantly decreases with increasing distance
to the boundary. The coefficient of interest, however, the price discontinuity at
the boundary β f is hardly affected by allowing for the prices of characteristic
to depend on the distance to the boundary. House prices in Germany are about
16% lower than in the Netherlands.
16We divide the border into segments of 1 km length. This results in a total of 490
border segments that are included in the estimation of Equation (2).
17This result is robust to excluding the border segments (B) as explanatory variable.
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Table 2  Hedonic regression.
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic
Average border effect (β f , in
percent)
−22.79*** −21.02*** −15.00*** −15.10***
−49.5 −34.1 −18.5 −14.9
Distance Germany (*100) 0.78*** 0.47 −3.15*** −0.18
9.8 1.73 −4.9 −0.14
Distance Netherlands (*100) −1.92*** −3.09*** −6.97*** −9.62***
−53.4 −26.2 −25.8 −18.1
(Distance Germany)2 (*100) 0.04 1.01*** −0.40
1.2 6.3 −0.7
(Distance Netherlands)2 (*100) −0.14*** −1.17*** −2.37***
−10.4 −17.8 −10.9
(Distance Germany)3 (*1000) −0.72*** 1.65
−6.2 1.83
(Distance Netherlands)3 (*1000) −0.75*** −2.74***
−16.0 −7.9






Living space 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.59***
275.9 276.0 276.1 276.1
Lot size 0.19*** 0.19*** 18.59*** 18.58***
210.9 211.0 211.1 210.8
Number of rooms (in percent) 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.86***
24.8 24.7 24.9 24.9
Terraced house (in percent) −24.69*** −24.67*** −24.63*** −24.66***
−148.6 −148.5 −148.4 −148.5
Corner house (in percent) −20.01*** −20.00*** −19.96*** −19.98***
−126.2 −126.2 −126.0 −126.1
Adj R-squared (in percent) 82.62 82.63 82.65 82.66
Observations 193920 193920 193920 193920
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. t-Statistic un-
derneath. Additional control variables are the year of construction (eight dummy
variables: 1500–1905; 1906–1930; 1931–1944; 1945–1959; 1960–1970; 1971–1980;
1981–1990; 1991–2000; reference category is built after 2000) and dummy variables
for the border-segment (a total 490, each one with a length of 1 km).
Spatial Matching
Even though we only include objects within a certain threshold distance
to the boundary in the hedonic analysis, a concern one might have is that
this analysis refers to the whole German–Dutch border and thus compares
houses that may be hundreds of kilometers apart. Our use of fixed effects for
small border segments may not be sufficient to capture regional differences
Border Effects in House Prices 773
Figure 4  Price effect of distance to boundary.
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Negative values for distance indicate the Dutch side of the border, positive values the
German one.
Source: FUNDA, ImmobilienScout24, own calculations.
correctly. Therefore, we use matching techniques as an additional device to
test for the presence of border effects, as this allows for a comparison of
objects that are more or less directly adjacent. In a first step, we match all
objects on the German side to its closest geographical neighbor on the Dutch
side that was observed in the same year.18 As there are more observations
on the Dutch side of the border, some houses in the Netherlands have not
been matched to a German counterpart and therefore are excluded from the
following analysis.
Using these pairs of observations, we compute differences for all explanatory
variables. We subtract the characteristics of the Dutch houses from their
closest German counterpart; positive values indicate that, e.g., floor size in
the German houses is larger than in the Dutch ones.19
18The Stat module GEONEAR (Picard 2010) has been used.
19For the variables in price, living space and lot size we build the log difference. For
the three dummy variables representing the house type we build three new variables,
one for a matched pair consisting of a terraced house and a corner house, one for a
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Figure 5  Difference in lot size and living space.
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Houses within 3 km distance. Source: FUNDA, ImmobilienScout24, own computations.
We test if these differences in quality persist even when looking at objects
that are spatially close. Figure 5 shows the percentage differences for the
continuous explanatory variables living space and lot size. While differences
in living space do not seem to be driven by the country, lot sizes of spatially
close objects are substantially larger in Germany. This implies that even
spatially close houses that were observed in the same year, need to be quality
adjusted.
We estimate the hedonic price function
 ln pi = β f + βZ Zi + εi , (2)
where  ln p represents log price differences and Z represents differences in
the qualities of the characteristics and i identifies the matched pair. Negative
values for the coefficient β f indicate that prices in Germany are lower than
in the Netherlands, ε is an error term. We report the estimation results in
Table 3.
Houses on the Dutch side seem to be about 17% more expensive than oth-
erwise comparable houses in Germany. The results are robust to altering the
maximum distance between two houses. In addition, the estimated price effect
of about 17% is perfectly in line with the result of the hedonic regression
of 15% to 16%. The values of the other coefficients are also in line with
intuition.
pair of a terraced house and a detached house and one for a pair of a corner house
and a detached house. For pairs of similar house types all of the three variables are
assigned the value zero. For differences in the year of construction, we only observe
time periods we can control for by dummy variables for the Dutch side, we subtract
the time periods means. For the dummy representing houses built before 1906 we set
the value to 1900.
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Table 3  Matched pair regression.
Difference in 1 km 2 km 3 km
Average border effect (in percent) −18.18** −16.67*** −16.86***
−2.99 −5.5 −8.3
Living space 0.62*** 0.38*** 0.60***
5.1 6.9 15.6
(Living space)2 (*100) −34.04* 1.83 −2.85
−2.4 0.26 −0.59
Lot size 0.24*** 0.34*** 33.73***
3.64 13.9 20.3
(Lot size)2 (*100) −4.74 −5.62*** −6.71***
−1.7 −5.9 −10.0
Number of rooms (in percent) 0.02 0.98* −0.39
0.02 2.3 −1.3
Year of construction (*100) 0.87*** 0.71*** 0.71***
6.9 11.4 16.6
(Year of construction)2 (*10000) −0.63*** −0.36*** −0.42***
−3.5 −4.4 −7.2
Terraced, corner house (in percent) −18.10*** −8.90*** −18.10***
−3.81 −3.5 −9.9
Terraced, detached house (in percent) −41.69*** −25.90*** −29.52***
9.4 −10.9 17.8
Corner, detached house (in percent) −17.99*** −16.64*** −14.29***
−3.4 −6.8 −9.6
Distance to match (*100) −8.46 −1.20 −2.90**
−1.1 −0.6 −3.3
Adj R-squared (in percent) 64.75 66.72 66.96
Observations 391 1631 3842
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. t-Statistic underneath.
Regional Differences
Finally, we looked at possible geographical differences in the border effect.
To do so, we divide the border into three segments. If we follow the border
starting in the north, the first segment consists of the first 200 km, the second
one of the next 200 km and the third one of the remaining 156 km. We
then assign each of the matched pairs as explained in Section 5.3 to a border
segment, depending on the closest segment of the house located in Germany.
The number of observations in the North is substantially lower than in the
more urban environment in the South, as is also indicated by Figure A4.
The results of a matched pair regression referring to houses within 3 km on
both sides of the border show that the price difference is substantially more
pronounced in the northern part of the border (Table 4). One explanation for
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Table 4  Matched pair regression with regional differences.
Difference in 3 km 3 km
North (0 km to 200 km) −0.34*** −0.34***
(−11.7) (−12.0)
Middle (200 km to 400 km) −0.19*** −0.21***
(−8.2) (−9.1)
South (400 km to 556 km) −0.14*** −0.13***
(−7.0) (−6.2)
Difference in population density 0.04***
(12.3)
Adj R-squared (in percent) 68.17 69.37
Observations 3,827 3,827
t-Statistics in brackets underneath. *, **, *** indicate significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1%
level. Housing characteristics were included as control variables.
these different effects of the national border on house prices might be that
living in a foreign country is substantially less harmful in an urban environ-
ment where the level of infrastructure is high and crossing the boundary, e.g.,
to work in a different country, is less time consuming.
To test whether differences in population density are one factor driving price
differences, we include the difference in population densities as control vari-
able in a second regression.20 While differences in population densities have
a significant effect on the house price differences, regional differences hardly
seem to be affected by this. One explanation for this might be that the differ-
ences in population density are not as pronounced as one might have expected.
Comparing densities of spatially close objects, we find that in the northern
border segment, the average difference in population density is 1.3%, in the
middle segment the difference is about 1.6% and in the South, the difference
is only 0.3%.
Discussion of Results
According to the capitalization hypothesis,21 one source of house price dif-
ferences between Germany and the Netherlands might be different ancillary
20We use population densities based on a 1 km grid available from Eurostat. The
variable is defined as the log difference between the population density in Germany
and in the Netherlands. This way, a positive coefficient for the difference in population
density means that an increase in population density in the Netherlands c.p. increases
the (already negative) price difference.
21For a discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature, see Hilber (2017).
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costs. To investigate how much of the price difference at the border can be ex-
plained by charges directly related to housing, we collected information about
municipal taxes and other charges and discuss the case of full capitalization.
According to Wassenaar, Allers and Verhagen (2014) the following charges
are relevant for Dutch owner-occupiers: (1) a real estate tax of 0.11% of the
value of the house on average, (2) sewage charges of 0.12% and (3) waste
collection charges of 0.08%. The total of these taxes is on average 0.30% of
the value of the house. The taxes differ per municipality, and the maximum
for the whole country is 0.56% of the value of the house annually.
The situation in Germany is less clear. The property tax for West Germany
is based on a theoretical house value and a multiplier that is set by the local
government. In 2014, the average per capita tax revenue from property taxes
(type B) was 178 Euro in North Rhine-Westphalia (Statistisches Bundesamt
2015), one of the federal states sharing a border with the Netherlands. As-
suming an average household of two persons, this results in a tax burden of
356 Euro per household. Annual sewage charges are on average 700.69 Euro
with a maximum of 1302.30 Euro. Waste collection charges are on average
262.80 Euro with a maximum of 528.00 Euro.22 For the average household,
German local charges thus appear to be twice as high as in the Netherlands.
Assuming the same value of houses on both sides of the border (that is, with-
out controlling for quality characteristics, and in agreement with our finding
in the naı̈ve regression discontinuity design, (see Section 5.2) this implies a
total annual charge of 0.6% of the house value.23
Using an interest rate of 4.5%, which has been the average interest rate for new
lending for house purchases with a duration of at least five years in the sample
period from 2007 to 2011, this suggests a difference of 7 percentage points of
the house value that can be attributed to differences in house-related charges.
This still leaves about 10% of the house price difference unexplained. Even
in the southern part of the Netherlands, where the total price gap is smallest,
differences in local charges explain only about 50% of the total price gap.
Conclusion
This article has investigated the considerable difference between house prices
in Germany and in the Netherlands while focusing on the difference at the
22Information on charges for sewage and waste collection are from the Tax Payers
Union NRW.
23We used €218.000 as the reference value, which is close to the mean average housing
price on the German side of the border (see Table 1). For the higher Dutch average,
housing related charges expressed in percent of the house price would be somewhat
lower.
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border. Analyzing Dutch house prices in the period 1985–2013, we find that
prices in the border region increased less in the Dutch–German border region
than prices of objects 50 km away from the border. Additionally to that, the
discrepancy of prices in the border region and in the heartland and migration
flows from the Netherland to Germany increased in the early 2000s. This
coincides with a change in the tax rules in 2001 that allowed Dutch workers
to take advantage of mortgage interest deductibility even when moving across
the border while keeping their job in the Netherlands. All this is suggestive of
arbitrage made possible by the change in tax rules and lets us conclude that
a potential prices difference between house prices in the two countries has a
meaningful interpretation as the willingness of Dutch households to accept
the combination of higher house prices and staying in one’s own country.
Although arbitrage is relatively easy because Germany and the Netherlands
are both Schengen-countries, we show that a sharp discontinuity in the quality-
adjusted house prices at the border remained present in the period 2007–2011.
This conclusion is based on the analysis of combined geocoded datasets on
real estate prices in both countries. Using various techniques, we find a
similar border effect on house prices. It is also in line with the empirical
literature on housing in Europe. Cheshire and Magrini (2009) find that cities
within the European Union still form national urban systems rather than
a single European-wide system. Jacobs-Crisioni and Koomen (2014) show
that national borders still affect the spatial urban pattern in northern Europe.
Notwithstanding the fact that there is no “natural” border between the two
countries, the progress made in the unification of the European Union and
changes in the tax code facilitating house price arbitrage, there still is a gap
in house prices in the Dutch–German border region.
On average, the difference in (last listed) asking prices seems to be about 16%
of the price of a house, or approximately 38,000 Euro at the mean. Taking
into account differences in ancillary costs, these explains about 7 percentage
points of the house price gap and leave close to 10 percentage points of the
house price difference unexplained. Even in the southern part of the border
region, where the total price gap is smallest, differences in local charges
explain only about 50% of the total price gap.
One interpretation of this remaining gap is that the Dutch are still reluctant to
live among the Germans and appear to be willing to forego a substantial finan-
cial benefit. As differences in language and culture affect economic outcomes
such differences might also be an explanation for remaining differences in
housing prices.
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Appendix
Figure A1  Bilateral migration, Netherlands and Germany, 1974–2012
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: Destatis.
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Table A1  Hedonic regression with distance to border interaction.
linear quadratic cubic quartic
Average border effect (β f , in percent) −23.65*** −21.21*** −16.23*** −15.89***
−54.3 −34.4 −20.1 −15.8
Distance Germany (*100) −0.74 −1.66* −4.04*** −1.95
−1.22 −2.5 −4.61 −1.4
Distance Netherlands (*100) 5.42*** 4.41*** 0.51 −2.18***
14.6 11.6 1.1 −3.4
(Distance Germany)2 (*100) 0.08** 0.77*** −0.24
2.7 4.9 0.44
(Distance Netherlands)2 (*100) −0.15*** −1.12*** −2.36***
−11.1 −17.2 −10.9
(Distance Germany)3 (*1,000) −0.51*** 1.20
−4.4 1.33
(Distance Netherlands)3 (*1,000) −0.71*** −2.75***
15.3 −8.0
(Distance Germany)4 (*10,000) −0.94
−1.9
(Distance Netherlands)4 (*10,000) −1.10***
−6.0
Living space 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50***
122.6 122.2 122.6 122.5
Lot size 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21***
139.0 139.0 139.0 139.0
Living space* Distance Germany (x100) 2.96*** 3.00*** 2.95*** 2.95***
21.8 22.1 21.6 21.7
Lot size* Distance Germany (x100) −2.09*** −2.08*** −2.07*** −2.06***
−35.0 −35.0 −34.7 −34.6
Living space* Distance Netherlands (x100) −2.04*** −2.08*** −2.04*** −2.05***
−23.0 −23.5 −23.0 −23.2
Lot size* Distance Netherlands (x100) 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.46***
14.63 14.6 14.7 14.8
Number of rooms (in percent) 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.85***
24.6 24.6 24.8 24.8
Terraced house (in percent) −24.79*** −24.76*** −24.73*** −24.75***
−149.7 −149.6 −149.5 −149.6
Corner house (in percent) −20.33*** −20.33*** −20.29*** −20.30***
−128.5 −128.4 −128.3 −128.4
Adj R-squared (in percent) 82.76 82.77 82.79 82.79
Observations 193920 193920 193920 193920
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level. t-Statistic un-
derneath. Additional control variables are the year of construction (eight dummy
variables: 1500–1905; 1906–1930; 1931–1944; 1945–1959; 1960–1970; 1971–1980;
1981–1990; 1991–2000; reference category is built after 2000) and dummy variables
for the border-segment (a total 490, each one with a length of 1 km).
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Figure A2  Foreigners on both sides of the German–Dutch border
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: PBL.
Figure A3  Change in price gradient within 50 km of the Dutch–German border
(1985–2013).
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Figure A4  Population density
Source: Eurostat.
